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Abstract
We examine the question of adaptive firm conduct using longitudinal product-level data from
three large horizontal mergers in the food manufacturing industry. Our model is grounded in a “post-
structural” view of competition that we deduce from recent writings from the fields of strategy,
organizational ecology, and industrial organization. Consistent with this model, we find that the
influence of horizontal merger on product performance (i.e., rent) varies with the product niche, time,
the specific firms that merged, and dominance of the product, and its market scope.Towards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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1. Introduction
Debate in the strategy literature continues as to whether
strategic conduct or the market environment are the primary
determinants of firm performance (e.g., McGahan and Porter,
1997; Rumelt, 1991). To date, virtually all empirical
investigations of this debate use static, cross-sectional
models that treat strategy as a constant and assume that
equilibrium in performance exists within the time frame of
the data. These studies are therefore silent about an essential
element of strategy; i.e., the ability of a firm in a dynamic
environment to adapt in response to ever-changing
environmental pressures. In this study, we account for this
missing element by using longitudinal product-level data
from three large horizontal mergers in the food
manufacturing industry. We ground our examination on a
post-structural view of competition that we deduce from
recent writings in the fields of strategy, organizational
ecology, and industrial organization. In brief, this view
asserts that firms can attain and sustain positive performance
outcomes through their own initiative. Our intent is to shed
new light on the debate about strategic conduct and market
environment by observing their dynamic interplay. In this
process, we hope to identify the extent to which a firm can,
over time, buffer itself from the binding constraints of
environmental forces.
We focus on large horizontal food manufacturing mergers
because they are a particularly relevant phenomenon for
studying the outcomes of strategic conduct in a
post-structural competitive world. First, mergers in general
can be thought of as purposive acts, for they represent an
indisputable and deliberate reorientation of the firm's product
configuration with its environment. Second, each of the three
horizontal mergers (Nestlé/ Carnation, RJR/ Nabisco, and
General Foods/ Kraft) contained a mix of the two basic types
of product-scope adaptations, thus allowing us to examine
their relative effectiveness in dealing with dynamic structural
pressures. Specifically, some of the “merged” product lines
share similar resource spaces (e.g., cream and cottage
cheeses), thus increasing the acquiring firm's commitment to
that niche, or in organizational ecologist terms, a specialist
scope adaptation. Other merged product lines occupy
distinctly different resource spaces (e.g., canned baby foods
and potato chips), thus spreading the firm's resources over a
broader population of food manufacturing niches; i.e., a
generalist scope adaptation.
Finally, each of the three mergers in our sample brought
together, or “merged,” about one hundred branded food
product lines. This provides enough observations to apply
standard statistical methods to each merger in what amounts
to three individual empirical case studies. By investigating
the dynamic interplay between strategy and environmental
forces in one large horizontal merger at a time, we can be
confident that the product-level data from each merger is
homogeneous in ways that are not possible using standard
cross-sectional designs. That is, we can expect that all of the
products involved in a specific merger will be subject to
similar influences having to do with strategy, structure, and
other core features of the combined firms. Additionally, our
merger-specific investigative lens allows us the unique
opportunity to apply a positivist research design to one of the
originating foci of the field of strategic management; i.e.,
“the study of the singular, unique competing firm in a
changing environment” (Hatten, 1979:454).  
2. Towards a Post-Structural View of Competition
2.1 Antecedents
Until recently, industrial organization (IO) economics,
strategic management, and organizational ecology offered
three contrasting perspectives of competition. Traditional IO
is based on micro-economic models of imperfectly
competitive markets. It presumes that “above-normal”
profits, or rents, are possible only as long as imperfections in
the market exist. According to this deterministic view of
competition, firm conduct is viewed solely in terms of those
rent-seeking behaviors that are allowed by market structure.
This is not to say that IO “structuralists” don’t recognize that
some businesses might attain “superior enterprise
differentiation,” or powerful market positions without the aid
of collusive or other structural influences (Anderson, 1990).
However, these economists view the outcome from firm-
conduct as a short-lived anomaly, one destined to be eroded
by market equilibrium forces that return all industries to their
competitive state.
Not surprisingly, strategists never embraced the
structuralist’s model. The field of strategy is grounded on the
assumption that firm’s have rent-seeking options beyond
those determined by the structure of the market in which it
competes. For example, Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece (1991)
pointed out that the case studies of the 1960s and 1970s
found numerous exceptions to the structural view; i.e.,
instances where intra-industry performance differences
persisted independent of structural determinants. These
observations were soon followed by some complimentary
theories about firm- specific conduct such as Rumelt'sTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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(1974) theory of corporate diversification, Porter's (1980)
theory of competitive advantage, the resource-based view of
the firm (Barney, 1991; Connor, 1991), and Ghoshal and
Moran's (1996) notion of “purposive adaptation”. According
to this latter notion of strategic choice, a firm can consciously
pursue efficiencies “which create new options and expand the
scope of activities beyond those that markets alone can
coordinate efficiently” (1996:42). Put another way, Ghoshal,
Moran, and others argue that strategy allows a firm to
partially separate, or buffer, itself from the binding
constraints of market equilibrium forces.
Organizational ecologists (OE) provide a third perspective
on competition. In contrast to the focus on market structure
by IO economists and on firm conduct by strategists,
ecologists focus on resource competition within populations
of organizations; i.e., groups of firms that share common
features. Ecologists define these firm features by the claims
an organization stakes out for itself in terms of the clients it
serves, the goods and services it produces, and the
technology it employs (Haveman, 1992). Whereas IO
economists and strategists are primarily interested in
explaining market power and financial performance,
ecologists are interested in explaining how differences among
firms affect survival (Boone and van Witteloostujin, 1995;
Hannan and Freeman, 1977), and hence, the dynamics of
competition at the population level (Baum and Mezias,
1992).
Like strategists, ecologists reject the static equilibrium
assumptions. Indeed, they view competition for resources as
a dynamic process involving different groupings of firms.
Unlike strategists, however, few ecologists before 1990
embraced the notion of purposive adaptation. Rather, they
were more like IO economists with their “semi-strong”
deterministic views that Hannan and Freeman (1989) refer to
as probabilistic, though OE’s deterministic views were
grounded on a very different rationale than that of IO.
Specifically, they contended that calculated strategic actions
are often tried but rarely successful because environments are
near-impossible to predict and organizations are relatively
inert because they are complex, resistant to change, and rely
on decision processes which are clouded by political agendas.
As such, OE predicted that organizational outcomes are only
loosely coupled to its adaptive efforts, for environments
change at a faster pace than an organization can adapt. The
long-term survival of a firm, therefore, is exogenously
determined almost by default.  Put differently, ecologists did
not perceive successful adaptations as the inevitable product
of a rationally planned and systematically administered
strategy, but rather as the occasional product of
happenstance.
2.2 Proposed Paradigm Shift
Writings in the fields of IO and OE are suggesting a
possible paradigm shift in that both fields are now
converging to a view of firm conduct that is less structurally
dependent, less deterministic, and less inertial. First, some IO
economists have expressed disenchantment with the static
equilibrium assumption that Teece (1984:90) referred to as
a “fictitious state.” Like strategists, these economists are
now accepting the possibility that firms can consciously
pursue dynamic efficiencies; i.e., firm conduct may have an
enduring impact on performance (e.g., Schmalensee, 1985;
Kwoka and Ravenscraft, 1986; McGee, 1988:19; Jacquemin,
1990:6).
Second, some organizational ecologists are now also
accepting the view that inertia has a manageable component;
i.e., firms have some discretion to enact, adapt to, and
manipulate their environment (see Barnett and Carroll, 1995,
for a review). For example, Barnett and Amburgey's (1990)
model of mass dependence posited that some large firms
impose a disproportionate influence on resource competition.
Of central importance to this model—and models by, among
others, Carroll and Hannan (1989) and Baum and Mezias
(1992)￿to ecological theory is that instead of treating all
firms as more or less homogeneous, these models opened the
field to consider the effect of industry sub-structures on
population dynamics. That is, these models shifted the level
of analysis of the field closer to that of the firm. This trend
was continued by others who proposed that inertial forces
can be overcome through a multifaceted transformation to
the firm; i.e., the kind of change that causes the firm to
abruptly “jump” to a new organizational-environment
alignment (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990; 1995).
In a recent OE study, Barnett and Freeman (1997)
investigated one kind of multifaceted transformation, brought
about by the simultaneous introduction of multiple products.
They argued that this kind of punctuated change gives an
organization little recourse but to alter core features in order
to accommodate the new business imperatives. For example,
the organization may have to change strategies, reallocate
resources, modify administrative routines, and redefine
certain job responsibilities, all of which may alter the
network of relationships within the organization and with
stakeholders outside of the organization. Barnett and
Freeman temper this prediction about manageable inertia
with a caveat: the broad scope of the change and abrupt
manner in which it is introduced will initially engender
unanticipated coordination problems (Iansiti, 1997),
organizational resistance, and therefore a rate of exit. These
inertial problems, however, may dissipate with trial, error,
and time, as the organization learns to adjust to its new formTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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and circumstances (Ambergey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993).
Consequently, Barnett and Freeman (1997:8) predicted that
“the increase in failure rate falls away as time passes after
the change.”
We think that the recent recognition of manageable inertia
by Barnett, Freeman, and other ecologists, coupled with the
acceptance by IO economists of the possibility of dynamic
market efficiencies, suggests that the two fields are moving
closer to the strategic notion of purposive adaptation. With
the possible removal of tenets that had separated the three
fields, opportunities open for a less critical transfer of theory,
concepts, and measures, and the prospect of building a more
unified model of competition.
For example, the three fields hold similar views of firm
performance, though they use different terminology. IO
conceptualizes firm performance in terms of variance from
some market expected level, referring to this variance as
either “above-normal” profits, or rent. Strategists also view
performance relative to some market-wide baseline, using
such measures as industry-adjusted profitability and growth.
Underlying the IO conceptualization is the concept of market
power while underlying the strategy conceptualization are the
concepts of competitive advantage and differentiation. While
the determinants of these two sets of concepts may differ,
they nevertheless represent the same outcome: the ability of
a firm to increase its output price above the competitive level
and/or decrease its input costs below the competitive level
(Porter, 1980). In contrast, organizational ecologists
generally do not define performance in terms of profitability,
nor at the business or firm level of analysis. Rather, OE
defines performance in terms of the growth and legitimacy of
a population of firms: the market acceptance of a particular
type of organizational form at any given point in time.
Accordingly, the greater the acceptance, the better the
organizations are able to compete for scarce resources, and
therefore survive. Recently, however, some ecologists such
as Havemen (1993; 1994) and Baum (1996) have argued for
the use of business-level measures of performance in OE
research.
1 At a broad level, therefore, the performance
concepts of OE are compatible with those of IO and strategy:
should a firm have a high level of market acceptance at any
point in time (legitimacy), it will be more able to compete for
                                               
1 Haveman (1993; 1994) argued that ecological models need to
account for firm-specific performance in order to: (1) keep the
causes of organizational change distinct from the effects of the
change, for otherwise the cause/effect logic of an OE model may
blur; e.g., some observed organizational changes may be symptoms
of decline rather than the causes of failure; and (2) prevent the
possibility that any observed link between change and failure is
spurious, in that both might be caused by the same firm-specific
performance effects.  
limited resources (power), and thus should earn higher levels
of performance (growth and profitability) than its less
legitimate counterparts. For ease of presentation, we will use
the term rent to represent the post-structural concept of
performance as we develop hypotheses about the
performance implications of purposive adaptation. 
2.3 Horizontal Mergers in a Post-Structural World
Barnett and Freeman’s concept about manageable inertia
applies well to horizontal mergers. Horizontal mergers are
deliberate acts, even if they are not always successful in
creating rent. Further, they are also undeniably punctuated
and disruptive events, for they abruptly bring together two
firms and their previously independent set of products and
organizational features. From the merged organization’s
perspective, therefore, horizontal mergers involve a
simultaneous introduction of multiple products, causing
many of the merged products to abruptly “jump” to a new
organizational -environment alignment. Horizontal mergers
also give the merged organization little recourse but to
change strategies, reallocate resources, modify administrative
routines, and redefine certain job responsibilities in an effort
to rationalize the two sets of features.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to point out
how our study’s research domain differs from that of Barnett
and Freeman’s (1997) study. They studied exit (failure) rates
of newly introduced, technologically innovative products
among semiconductor manufacturers, or “specialist” scope
adaptations in a market niche with high excess-carrying
capacity. Ecologists define excess-carrying capacity as the
maximum amount of available resources in a niche. Our
study focuses on the ability of a firm’s conduct, including its
specialist and generalist scope adaptations, to earn rents in
mostly mature food-product niches. That is, niches that by
inference have considerably less excess carrying capacities
than the niches in Barnett and Freeman’s study, because
“maturity” is often synonymous with a few dominant firms,
high entry barriers, and a low rate of entry (Swaminathan,
1998:389). Ecologists note that it is more difficult to exploit
resource opportunities in niches with low excess carrying
capacity because of their intensely competitive, and therefore
highly deterministic, nature (Brittain and Freeman, 1980).
Similarly, strategists note that mature, competitive structures
tend to impose a strong deterministic influence on firm
performance; i.e., firms generally have few adaptive options
in this market structure to obtain a sustainable advantage
(Porter, 1980: 237-253). As such, we think that the sample
frame of our study represents a more conservative context for
investigating how much strategic conduct matters. Further,
where Barnett and Freeman focused on products of yet
unproven commercial value, our sample contains productsTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 38 4
with long records of consumer acceptance.
3.  Hypotheses
We propose three sets of hypotheses; each calibrated at
product-level unit of analysis. This allows us to focus on the
product-niches contained within an industry and thereby
adopt a conventional OE unit of analysis (e.g., Delacroix and
Swaminathan, 1991; Carroll, 1985). The first set of
hypotheses deals with the ex ante market influences on a
product’s rent that are deterministic, or exogenous to the
merged firm’s adaptive actions (i.e., strategic conduct). The
second set deals with the dynamic (ex post) market
influences that might themselves be partially influenced by
the merged firm’s adaptations. The final set of hypotheses,
and the ones that represent the core point of interest to this
study, deals entirely with the influences on the product’s rent
that emanate directly from the merged firm’s strategic
conduct.
3.1  Ex Ante Market Factors
One of the key research issues in IO economics is the
impact that horizontal mergers have on competition.
Horizontal mergers are those where the market shares of two
very similar businesses (i.e., same basic products and same
geographic markets) are combined. Fundamental to IO is the
general prediction that a horizontal merger can change the
“rules of the competitive game,” depending upon the
pre-existing (ex ante) structure of the effected market.
Specifically, IO posits that the more imperfectly competitive
the pre-existing structure, the more the horizontally merging
firm will be able to improve the power of its products’
positions, and thereby earn rents, without fearing an
immediate and effective reprisal by competitors (Scherer and
Russ, 1990) or dilution by a new entrant (Eckbo, 1985).
When evaluating a proposed horizontal merger in an antitrust
context, therefore, IO economists predict that:
H1: There is an inverse association between the pre-
merger competitiveness of a product's market niche and
that product’s post-merger rent.
This general prediction, however, questions what exactly
is meant by “imperfectly competitive market structure.” The
IO, strategy, and OE literatures suggest that market structure
is at least a two-dimensional construct. First, there is a rich
tradition of research in the IO literature that establishes a
positive relationship between the level of a market’s
concentration and its rent (e.g., Weiss, 1989; Cotterill, 1993;
1994). Concentration is also central to the IO predictions
about the monopoly effects of horizontal merger. Not
surprisingly, therefore, concentration has for years figured
prominently in the Federal Merger Guidelines, a formal
document that is revised periodically based on the latest
developments of IO theory. Some strategists (e.g.,
Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schoenecker, 1992) and
organizational ecologists (e.g., Carroll, 1985; Boeker, 1991)
also subscribe to this view and identify market concentration
as a key determinant of firm performance. Hence, our first
corollary hypothesis about initial market structural
conditions is:
H1a: There is a positive association between the pre-
merger level of concentration in a product's market
niche and that product's post-merger rent.
Ecologists, however, are more apt to define
competitiveness in terms of density, or the number of
businesses competing in a market niche, and use this
measure to proxy for the degree to which the carrying
capacity of the niche is filled (e.g., Delacroix, Swaminathan,
and Solt, 1989; Hannan and Freeman, 1989). The
competitive effects of density, as derived from the
ecologist’s “density-dependent” models, are straightforward:
competition for available resources will be higher in niches
with high density than in niches with low density, all else
being the same (e.g., Boeker, 1991; Carroll and Hannan,
1989; Tucker, Singh, Meinhard, and House, 1988). Hence:
H1b: There is an inverse association between the pre-
merger level of density in a product's market niche and
that product's post-merger rent.
As an aside, it may appear that concentration and density
have opposite effects on competition (high density increases
competition, while high concentration decreases
competition), although the correlation is not straightforward.
For example, Boeker's (1991) study of organizational
strategies in the brewing industry found the two constructs to
be inversely correlated, but only moderately so (r = -.25).
Various explanations have been proposed to explain why the
correlations are only moderate, some explanations derived
from theory (e.g., Carroll’s 1985 “resource partitioning”
model and Barnett and Amburgey’s 1990 “mass-
dependence” model) and others based on measurement
precision (e.g., Boone and van Wittleoostujin, 1995; Hannon
and Carroll, 1992).
2 We infer from these explanations that
                                               
2 For example, Boone and van Wittleoostujin (1995) posit that the
moderate correlation may arise because measures of density neglect
an important aspect of the size distribution of firms that is captured
by concentration, while measures of concentration, by focusing on
the share of the largest inhabitants, emphasize the properties of
only one tail of the size distribution. For example, the competitive
pressures of an industry dominated by a few large rivals (i.e.,
concentrated), but including also a large number of lessor rivalsTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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the measures of concentration may be capturing different
aspects of market structure than the OE measure of density.
Consistent with a post-structural model of competition, both
aspects of the initial market conditions should be specified,
as we did with H1a and H1b.
3.2 Ex Post Market Factors
The first set of hypotheses made predictions about post-
merger rents based on any imperfections that may have been
embedded in the initial structure of the effected markets.
Implicit to these predictions is the assumption that ex ante
market structural influences will remain more or less
constant over time, which of course may not be the case.
Structure may be altered by events exogenous to the merged
firm, such as by post-merger actions taken by rivals and by
trends in the general environment. Structure, however, may
also be altered by actions taken by the merged firm during
the post-merger period to leverage its newly gained position
in order to extract a higher level of rent from the merger. Or,
put in OE terms, just as environmental pressures may force
an adaptive response, so too might the response engender
changes to the extant structure. The ex post hypotheses thus
attempts to account for the dynamic nature of market forces.
Like the ex ante hypotheses, the ex post hypotheses are
grounded on the same theories of imperfectly competitive
markets, concentration, and density. However, the ex post
hypotheses seek to explain post-merger rents based on actual
changes, rather than use ex ante conditions to predict those
rents. As we will discuss in the methods section, the dynamic
elements in the ex post tests are examined over six annual
contiguous post-merger time periods.
H2:  There is an inverse association between the
change in the post-merger competitiveness of a product's
market niche from its ex ante level and that product's
post-merger rent.
H2a:  There is a positive association between the
change in the post-merger level of concentration in a
product's market niche from its ex ante level and that
product's post-merger rent.
H2b:  There is an inverse association between the
change in post-merger level of density in a product’s
market niche from its ex ante level and that product's
post-merger rent.
In addition to concentration and density, a third ex post
structural influence suggested by some ecologists and
strategists has to do with the demand characteristics of a
niche or market. Density dependence models, for example,
                                                                                 
(i.e., dense) may be quite different from the competitive pressures
of a concentrated industry where all the lessor rivals have already
exited due to “market shakeout.”
attribute population dynamics to temporal variations in the
carrying capacity of a niche (Delacroix and Carroll, 1983;
Delacroix, Swaminathan, and Solt, 1989). For example,
Boeker (1991) and Swaminathan (1998) proxy for carrying
capacity of the brewing industry by calculating the total
consumption (demand) for beer in each state. As was the
case with density, proponents of the population dynamics
argument assert that the competition for available resources
will be higher in niches where growth in total demand is
slow, because slow growth induces a greater interdependence
among participants in a niche. Further, they view growth and
its impact on resource carrying capacity on a niche in a “s-
shaped” manner (Eighmy and Jacobson, 1980). Strategists
concur; they often use demand statistics to capture industry
life cycle effects modeled in a similar “s-shaped” manner
(Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984; Hambrick and Lei, 1985). In
brief, the life cycle model posits that most industries pass
through a series of stages, defined primarily by the level of
growth (Hofer, 1975), and each state has different
implications for the nature of competition. Like the
ecologists, strategists predict that when growth is high,
rivalry is generally low because each firm is able to operate
at, or near, capacity. As such, rivals in high growth markets
have little incentive to erode their own profits by competing
on price. It follows, therefore, that a merging firm has more
degrees of freedom to exploit any structural advantages
during periods of high growth, without fearing retaliation.
Consistent with the post-structural view of competition,
however, a merged firm’s actions may be more than a
response to some exogenous condition; its actions may
engender changes to the extant demand characteristics
(Carroll, 1985; Mitchell, 1998; Swaminathan, 1998). For
example, a product involved in a horizontal merger may gain
advantage in scale, scope, and differentiation. These
advantages may, in turn, affords the product competitive
options that can expand the resource carrying capacity of its
niche by capturing market opportunity from a population of
niches whose resource spaces partially overlap; i.e., niches
with close product substitutes. Thus, we posit that the ex
post demand characteristics of a niche, like ex post
concentration and density, are at least partly endogenous to
the merger, and therefore should be accounted for when
modeling the influence of ex post structural factors on rent.
H2c. There is a positive association between the
change in demand in a  product's market niche and that
product's post-merger rent.
3.3 The Role of Strategic Conduct
The central thesis of this study is that a firm can attain and
sustain rents through their own adaptive initiatives; i.e.,
purposively buffer itself from the dynamic constraints ofTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 38 6
market forces and its own inertial tendencies. Recall that this
thesis is grounded in a post-structural view of competition
that we deduced from recent writings from the fields of
strategy, organizational ecology, and industrial
organizations. Stated formally in the context of this study’s
research domain:
H3: The products involved in a horizontal merger will
generate post-merger rent.
A more precise prediction comes from the literatures of
strategy and OE, for these two fields developed somewhat
similar classifications of domain extensions. For example,
Rumelt's (1974) strategic classification of scope is largely
based on scale and scope efficiencies made possible as a firm
expands into domains that are relative similar in terms of
products, markets, and technologies. From this
conceptualization of strategy came Rumelt’s well-known
“relatedness hypothesis” about corporate diversification, that
was later extended by Lubatkin (1983) to classify merger
strategies. In brief, this hypothesis states that firms that put
their “eggs” in similar baskets (so that their assets can be
efficiently shared) and in “similar baskets of knowledge” (so
that their knowledge can be effectively transferred), will
outperform those firms that expand their scope into unrelated
“baskets.” Ecologists offer a somewhat analogous
classification. Whereas strategists refer to domain extensions
in term of “related” and “unrelated,” ecologists refer them as
“specialist” and “generalist” scope adaptations. A specialist
scope adaptation represents a domain extension that
increases a firm’s commitment to a narrow range of resource
spaces, or niches. In contrast, a generalist scope adaptation
is one where a firm spreads its resources over a broader
population of niches.
Of course, there are conceptual differences between the
two classifications. The focus of the strategic
conceptualization is primarily internal (assets, resources, and
capabilities) and static, while the focus of the OE
conceptualization is more externally focused and dynamic.
Just as structural pressures may force an adaptive response,
so too might the response engender changes to the extant
structure (e.g., see Delacroix and Swaminathan's 1991 study
of the wine industry, and Baum and Mezias’ 1992 study of
the Manhattan hotel industry). OE scholars thus view scope
adaptations as a process by which firms attempt to adapt to
their environment as a means to maintain legitimacy.
Since the post-structural view of competition suggests a
less critical transfer of concepts across the fields of strategy
and OE, we propose a view that synthesizes elements of both
conceptualizations. Specifically, when two products are
brought together that hold similar resource spaces, or niches,
as is the case with a specialist scope adaptation, there should
be more opportunities for them to attain rents than would be
available with a more “unrelated” generalist scope
adaptation. First, relatedness among the products involved in
a specialist scope adaptation should allow them to attain
scale and scope economies and enhance differentiation
(Porter, 1985: Chapters 3 and 4). Second, these related
products should also be more able to sustain the rents that
come with scale, scope, and differentiation because a
specialist adaptation involves a “fight, rather than flight”
response to competitive pressures (Lubatkin and Lane,
1996). Put differently, a specialist scope adaptation can use
its advantages of low cost and high buyer loyalty to push
some of the burden of dynamic market uncertainties onto its
less specialized rivals, and thus be more able to defend
(buffer) its rents against those uncertainties. This “strategic”
argument is consistent with the ecologist’s “resource
partitioning” model (Carroll, 1985); i.e., in concentrated
markets, specialists are more able to survive than generalists
because “they have access to greater resources”
(Swaminathan, 1998:393). The strategic argument is also
consistent with the ecologist’s “fitness-set theory” (Levins,
1968; Hannan and Freeman, 1977) which Baum (1996:84)
noted challenges the conventional contingency theory belief
that a generalist adaptation is preferred in more uncertain
environments because it is more able to “ride out
environmental fluctuations.” Specifically, the fitness-set
theory predicts that in environments such as the food
manufacturing industry where there are many small
fluctuations in supply and demand conditions (or what the
ecologists refer to as a “fine-grained environment”), a
specialist adaptation is always preferred regardless of the
level of uncertainty. 
H3a: Products involved in specialist scope adaptations
will attain and sustain higher post-merger rents than will
generalist scope adaptations.
A second corollary hypothesis about market share and rent
follows a rich tradition in the literatures of strategy
(Chandler, 1990; Porter, 1980), IO economics (e.g., Haller
and Cotterill, 1996; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985), and
organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Carroll,
1985). Strategists have long asserted that businesses that
hold a high-share of the market relative to its competitors
have more supply-side and demand-side advantages and are
thus more able to exploit market opportunities while
minimizing the threats of market-wide uncertainties (Porter,
1985). For example, a high-share business can better operate
at close to minimal cost levels, even during cyclical
downturns (Maloney and McCormick, 1983). A high-share
business can also better enhance its products' differentiation
by reducing the per-unit cost of differentiation and R&DTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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(Porter, 1985:120). Similar to our prediction about a
specialist scope adaptation (H3a), a high-share business
should be more able to defend and even expand its resource
base in its market niche. IO economists concur; from their
viewpoint, high-share businesses have more options to
exploit market imperfections (Ravenscraft, 1983).
Consequently, relative market share figures prominently in
IO predictions about the monopoly effects of horizontal
mergers (e.g., Baker and Bresnahan, 1985) and the 1992
Federal Merger Guidelines. Finally, the ecologists use of the
term “size” as analogous to share suggests that large size
may be interpreted by stakeholders as an outcome of prior
success. Size thus serves to enhance the legitimacy and
survival of the firm (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Large size
also serves to buffer a business from environmental
uncertainties and competitive challenges, thereby increasing
the probability that an organization will overcome obstacles
that might threaten the survival of smaller organizations
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Hence:
H3b: Products associated with high pre-merger
market share will attain and sustain higher post-merger
rent than will lower-share products.
Finally, a third corollary hypothesis comes from the
obvious observation that no two mergers are alike. Mergers
bring together two firms that are each somewhat unique in
terms of their own organizational features. Mergers also
involve buying firms that are each unique in terms of their
ability to consolidate the acquired firm's features and
manage cultural differences (Very, Lubatkin, Calori, and
Veiga, 1997; Haspelaugh and Jemison, 1991). For example,
ecologists have long noted that an organization gains skill
with repetition, a learning process that ecologists refer to as
“repetitive momentum” (e.g., Ambergey, Kelly and Barnett,
1993). It follows that the ability of a buying firm to manage
the merger change process is influenced by its history of
making mergers: each time a firm acquires another, it may
gain competency at that activity, though that competency
atrophies with time. These and many other factors suggest
a latent merger-specific conduct effect that is hard to
empirically specify, but also hard to deny.
3
H3c: Some merged firms will be more able to attain
and sustain rents from their merged products than will
other merged firms.
                                               
3 Rumelt (1991) also measured firm-specific conduct as a latent
construct in his investigation of structure and conduct effects.
4. Methodology
4.1 Sources of Data
The food manufacturing industry represents a conservative
context for investigating purposive adaptation. Most food
product niches in the U.S. tend to be slow growth, mature,
highly competitive, and thus by inference have low excess
carrying capacity. Truly innovative products are hard to
come by and most are easy to imitate, and firms who are able
to introduce new products tend to follow strategies of
product proliferation which increases density. Moreover, the
food retailing industry has become increasingly consolidated.
The retailers who survived tried to use their increased size to
extract more money from the food manufacturers for the
privilege of “renting” their valuable shelf space (Mandel and
Heinbockel, 1984). It may not be surprising, therefore, that
food manufacturers were engaging in horizontal mergers
during the decade of the 1980, including the three very large
ones in our study, as a way to ensure and enhance their own
destiny (Connor and Geithman, 1988). Put differently, some
food manufacturers viewed horizontal mergers as a
purposive means to adapt to the dynamic constraints of
market forces.
Further, the food manufacturing industry contains a unique
source of data, obtained by SAMI (Selling Area Markets,
Inc., a private market research firm) that is well suited for
studying the dynamic effects of adaptive firm conduct. SAMI
data is specified at the line-of-product level, making it a
much finer-grain unit of analysis than provided by
conventional sources, such as the FTC's Line-of-Business
data used by, among others, Rumelt (1991) and Schmalensee
(1985), or the Compustat Business Segment data used by,
among others, McGahan and Porter (1997). This finer-
grained data affords a number of research design advantages.
For example, it promotes a conservative test of the firm
conduct (H3) hypotheses. McGahan and Porter (1997)
speculated that the full deterministic force of industry is
amplified when the data used to measure it are more precise;
i.e., do not suffer from an aggregation bias associated with
pooling data from non-competing products. This bias is well
known to exist with 4-digit SIC definitions of industry
(Scherer and Ross, 1990; Schmalensee, 1989). For example,
non-competing products such as canned baby foods and
canned soup are classified in the same 4-digit SIC industry
(#2032) as pickled fruits and soy sauce (#2035). Line-of-
product data provides a means to construct precise measures
of structure and conduct for every non-competing product,
and thus a metric to test important theoretical questions that
to date remain untested.
 SAMI provided annual data (1981-1990) on price and
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whose annual sales exceeded $1 million (about 3,650
products), and for their generic counterparts. SAMI collected
its data directly from grocery warehouses in 54 metropolitan
areas across the United States. It then grouped the data into
495 product categories, using definitions that agricultural
economists consider to be meaningful and precise indicators
of economic markets (Connor, Rodgers, Marion, and
Mueller, 1985). As such, the product categories are close
representations of what organization ecologists call distinct
resource spaces, or niches. Finally, SAMI grouped the 495
product categories into 75 product families, based on
commonalties in distribution requirements and consumer
perceptions of substitutability (Connor, et al., 1985). For
example, the product family “Cereal” contains three product
categories: ready-to-eat, breakfast bars, and hot cereals.
Similarly, the product family “Baby Foods” contains five
product categories: formula, baby breakfast foods, baby
juices, baby meals, and miscellaneous.
We tested our hypotheses one merger at a time by using
SAMI data and two sampling criteria. First, each merger had
to be large; i.e., involve a sufficient number of product-level
observations to adequately run our statistical models.
Second, each merger had to have taken place no later than the
mid-1980s so that we had access to time series data over
enough years to account for any market equilibrium forces.
Three mergers met the first criterion about number of
products, but only two, the 1984 acquisition of Nabisco
brands by R.J. Reynolds (involving 93 branded food
products) and the 1984 acquisition of Carnation Company by
Nestlé (involving 73 branded food products), met the second
criterion about years of available data. The fact that these
two large mergers took place in the same year is fortuitous
since it allowed us to test the dynamic interplay between
structure and conduct for both mergers over the same six
year time period (1984 through 1990, the last year that
SAMI collected data
4), thereby holding market influences
constant. A pairwise listing of these 166 products that
contained complete annual data over the period 1983 and
1990 reduced the sample size to 132 products. The 1988
acquisition of Kraft by the General Foods (GF) division of
Philip Morris involving 155 branded products did not meet
the second criterion. Because the Kraft/GF merger took place
four years later, and thus contains only enough data to
investigate the study's hypotheses over a two-year period, we
ran our tests separately on this data, primarily for the
purpose of sensitivity analysis.
                                               
    
4 SAMI's warehouse withdrawal data was the accepted metric during
the 1980s. However, the metric changed with the advent of scanner based
systems, and it was Nielsen and IRI that took the first mover advantage;
SAMI failed to adjust its system of data collection and soon after (1991)
went out of business.
As an important aside, testing our hypotheses one merger
at a time in a single industry allowed us to control for four
sources of variance common to cross-sectional studies: (1)
non-comparable industries (our sample frame consists of
firms from only one industry, food manufacturing); (2) non-
comparable firms within an industry (our sample frame
consists of only six large broad-based, multi-product food
manufacturers who sell brand name products); (3) non-
comparable within-firm data (our data comes only from
branded food products from these large firms); and (4) non-
comparable data due to firm-specific differences (even firms
from the same general strategic group within the same
industry are not fully comparable; i.e., each firm is unique in
the way it is organized, governed, in the way decisions are
made, in their distinctive competencies, and so on).
4.2 Dependent Variable: Rent
Rent can be thought of as the variance in performance
above some market-expected level. As we mentioned earlier,
the concept of rent is closely akin to market power in the IO
economic literature, competitive advantage and
differentiation in the strategic management literature, and at
some broad level with growth and legitimacy in the
organization ecology literature. Defining the concept is one
thing; measuring it is quite another. Given that the focus of
our study is to assess the dynamic impact that a merger has
on the rent of the affected branded product, we measure the
construct as “the change in a merged product’s price after
controlling for two factors that are expected to covary with
a change in price: the change in the product’s market
share and the change in the product’s cost.” Further, SAMI
data is unusually rich in that it allows us to compute this very
specific measure of performance for all products in all
pertinent niches over time. As such, SAMI data may meet the
concerns of those ecologists who note the importance of
including business-level performance measures in their
models (e.g., Baum and Singh, 1996; Haveman, 1993).
First, we constructed a 2-year Price Change measure for
each branded product involved in a merger. We did this by
subtracting the price of each branded product in 1983, or one
year before the merger, from its price in 1985, or one year
after the merger (see Kristoff, 1996; Bedeian and Day, 1994;
and Tisak and Smith, 1994, who recommend the continued
use of change measures, even in light of the cautionary
remarks made by Edwards, 1993; and Edwards and Parry,
1993). Of course, this 2-year measure represents too short of
a time horizon to capture rent in a post-structural view of
competition. For example, we infer from ecologists such as
Barnett and Freeman (1997) that the anticipated benefits
from a simultaneous, multifaceted adaptation might not show
up in this 2-year timeframe because of inertial problems ofTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 38 9
coordination and resistance. We infer from other ecologists
that any benefits might be short-lived, given the slow growth,
mature, low resource carrying capacity nature that likely
characterizes most of the affected product niches in our
study. Recognizing these two temporal considerations, we
lengthened the time horizon of our measure by calculating
five other annual Price Change measures: a 3-year Price
Change measure (i.e., price data from 1986 versus 1983)
through a 7-year Price Change measure (1990 versus 1983).
Second, similar to the price change measures, we computed
six annual Market Share Change measures using the
branded product's 1983 pre-merger market share as the
baseline to compare its market shares 3 years through 7 years
after the year of the merger. All things being the same, we
expect that as a product’s price increases, its share will
decrease due to expected demand elasticities. Third, we
computed six annual Cost Index Change Measures, using
the 1983 price data for the branded product's private label
counterparts as the baseline. As an important aside, because
the efficient scale in food manufacturing is generally low
(Scherer and Ross, 1990: 581-582), the price of private
labels in the food manufacturing industry is accepted by
agricultural economists to be a good approximation of the
cost of producing and distributing products of similar quality
to the branded products (Connor and Peterson, 1992;
Rogers, 1987).
5 As such, the change in the price of a branded
                                               
  
5  Perhaps this point is best illustrated by recognizing that it is the small
private label manufacturers, and not the large branded product
manufacturers, who base their survival entirely on a low price, and
therefore low cost. These firms  “sell to retailers in large quantities under
conditions of continuous price negotiations with professional retail buyers
who are well informed about product quality and availability” (Connor
and Peterson, 1992: 158). Also, these firms produce products that are
approximately the same in terms of quality as the products produced by
the branded manufacturers (Scherer and Ross, 1990: 581-582). Private
labelers can afford to do this because the technologies are generally stable
and common knowledge. In short, if the minimum efficient scale of
manufacturing in this industry was high, the small private label producers
would be unable to defend their cost minimization positions; the large,
branded products manufacturers could sell their products at a price below
the cost curves of their smaller, private label counter parts, while still
maintaining persistent profits. Also, the branded manufacturers could
leverage their volume advantages obtained from their branded product
business to enter the private label business and overwhelm the private
labelers. However, there is a little evidence that either conduct happened;
indeed, private-label food manufacturing by branded manufacturers is rare
(Connor, et al., 1985: 220-223). Distribution economies are also doubtful
in food manufacturing because the production plants of the merged firms
are unlikely to be in close proximity to coordinate shipping from a single
location. Furthermore, few shipments are made directly to the retailer
because retailers generally perform their own wholesaling activities or use
their own wholesale firms. Therefore, the retailers, and wholesalers, not
the producers, are more likely to be concerned with the efficiency of the
distribution system, while being indifferent about the origin of the
producer's shipments.
product, net of the change in the price of its private label
counterparts, can be thought of as the branded product’s
profit margin. Each annual Cost Index Change can also be
thought of as representing a much more precise measure of
the inflationary pressures on a product category than some
general index of all consumer prices such as the CPI.
 Finally, we partialled out the variance in the 2-year Price
Change measures associated with the 2- year Share and Cost
measures by entering the 2-year Price Change measure as the
dependent variable, and the 2-year Share and Cost measures
as covariates in a hierarchically constructed regression model
that we will soon more fully specify. We did the same for the
3- through 7-year measures; i.e., we ran our regression model
six times, once for each set of Price, Share, and Cost
measures. In sum, we measured Rent as the temporal change
in a product’s price net its covariance with its corresponding
temporal changes in share and cost.
4.3 Ex Ante Market Variables
We defined the level of market concentration before the
merger, or Initial Market Concentration (H1a), as the sales
in tonnage of the top two selling products in each line-of-
product market niche during 1983 (the year before the
merger year) divided by the total tonnage sales for that niche
in 1983, including the sales of private labels. As an aside,
concentration in the IO and strategy literatures is generally
measured as the share of the market held by the four largest
selling brands, or by the sum of the squared market share of
all firms in the market (the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index).
Consistent with prior research in the food industry, however,
we based our concentration ratio on the share of the two
largest selling brands because most food product markets are
highly concentrated, particularly at the niche level (Kwoka
and Ravenscraft, 1986). We measured Initial Market
Density (H1b) by counting the number of different brands
listed by SAMI in each market (line-of-product) niche during
1983.
4.4 Ex Post Market Variables
As we did with Initial Market Concentration, we computed
a concentration measure for the market niche during 1985, or
the first year after the year of the merger, subtracted from it
the Initial (or 1983) Market Concentration. We used this
Concentration (2 year) Change (H2a) measure in the
regression model to explain Price (2 year) Change. We then
computed Concentration (3 year) Change by substituting the
1986 concentration measure into the change metric for the
1985 concentration measure. Concentration (3 year) Change
is used in the regression model to explain Price (3 year)
Change. We follow the same method to construct
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(7 year) Change (1990). As we did with the six
Concentration Change measures, we compute six Density
Change (H2b) measures. Finally, we computed six Market
Growth (H2c ) measures by subtracting the sales (in
tonnage) observed for each market niche for each of the six
post-merger years (1985 to 1990) from the sales of that
niche in 1983.
4.5 Strategic Conduct Variables
The study’s third set of hypotheses predicted that the rent
generation potential of horizontal merger products is
determined by at least three features about the merger. We
measured Scope Adaptation (H3a) as a categorical variable
(0=Generalist; 1=Specialist). Consistent with the
organizational ecology’s use of the term, we designated a
Specialist Scope Adaptation as one where a branded product
of one firm (be it the buying or acquired firm) is in the same
product “family,” and therefore overlaps with branded
products in the other firm. (Recall that the 495 product
categories, or niches, in the SAMI data are grouped into 75
product families.) As such, a specialist adaptation involves
products that are close substitutes, both in terms of market
perceptions and distribution requirements; e.g., a potato chip
brand and a corn chip brand, both classified under the
product family “snack foods.” Of the products involved in
the Nestlé and RJR mergers, 24 (18%) involved specialist
adaptations. With the Kraft/General Foods merger, 30 (18%)
were specialist. Also consistent with the OE use of the term,
we designated a Generalist Scope Adaptation as one
involving branded food products that come from different
product families. We measure Market Dominance (H3b) as
a categorical variable: if the product of interest is one of the
two top market share leaders (in terms of tonnage sold) in its
niche in 1983 (the year before the year of the merger), then
we assign it a value of 1; otherwise it receives a value of 0.
Finally, we also defined Merger-Specific Effects (H3c) as
a categorical variable (0=Nestlé/Carnation merger;
1=RJR/Nabisco merger) intended to capture the variance of
a latent conduct effect.
5. Results
Part I of Table 1 contains the means, standard deviations,
and intercorrelations of the variables on the 1985 data,
pooled across the Nestlé/Carnation and RJR/Nabisco
mergers; i.e., during the first full year after the year of the
merger. (The descriptive statistics on the data for the other
five years following the year of the merger are available from
the authors, but are withheld here because they bear strong
similarity to the first year data.) The statistics reveal a large
negative correlation (-.60) between Initial Concentration and
Initial Density, and large positive correlation (.89) between
Initial Density (an ex ante measure) and its ex post
counterpart, Density Change. However, diagnostic
procedures suggest that the estimated parameters were not
degraded by these correlations.
6 Part II of Table 1 shows the
six year trend in Price Change for the branded products
involved in each of the two mergers and their corresponding
price changes in their respective private label counterparts,
or the Cost Index Change measures. These statistics reveal
a similar price trend for both during the first four post-
merger years such that branded products maintained about an
eight cent differential over their private label counterparts.
Interestingly, the price differential increased during the final
two post-merger years.
We tested the study's hypotheses on the 1984
RJR/Nabisco and Nestlé/Carnation mergers with six
regression models, one for each of the six annual timeframes,
beginning in 1985. Each model is specified with ten
independent variables in the form:
Price Changei = Control Variables (Market Share Changei
+ Cost Index Changei)+ Ex Ante Variables (Initial Market
Concentration + Initial Market Density)+ Ex Post
Variables (Concentration Changei + Density Changei +
Market growthi)+ Firm Conduct Var’s (Scope Adaptation
+ Market Dominance + Merger-Specific)
where i = the 2-year change in 1985 (1985 vs 1983)
through the 7-year change in 1990.
We tested our regression model using a Zellner's
Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique, or SUR, from the
statistical package, SHAZAM. SUR is a form of generalized
least square regression that takes advantage of correlated
cross-equation errors to provide more precise within-
equation parameter estimates than OLS (Greene, 1990:
510).
7 
 SUR does this by using a multi-stage estimation
technique in which the six regression equations are run
simultaneously as a system. Put differently, when the
disturbance terms of different regression equations are
mutually correlated, SUR incorporates relevant information
from the other estimation stages into final estimates of each
regression model (Griffeths, Hill, and Judge, 1993: 551).
8
                                               
6 Collinearity is indicated by a variance inflation factor (VIF) in
excess of 10 and a Condition Index in excess of 30 (Norusis, 1993:
355-7). The VIFs for Initial Density (8.5) and Density Change
(8.2) are not suggestive of collinearity, nor is the Condition Index
,which did not exceed 10 in any of the six annual regression runs.
7 We ran our equations using OLS and found that SUR produced
parameter estimates with more than 28% less variance (i.e., more
precise estimates) than OLS.
8 Cross-equation error correlation (i.e., heteroskedasticity) is
indicated by the Breusch-Pagan test ( c
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for all Variables on 1985 Data.
Part 1: Correlations
1
Variable  mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Price Change .13 .26 —
2. Market Share Change .00 .03 .08
3. Cost Index Change .05 .17 .62 -.07
4. Initial Market Conc. .43 .18 .06 -.17 .17
5. Initial Market Density 21.08 23.45 .05 .00 -.14 -.60
6. Concentration Change .00 .04 .13 .47 .06 -.09 -.05
7. Density Change 3.83 5.57 .12 -.06 -.15 -.51 .89 -.06
8. Market Growth -3.36 67.03 .03 -.17 .21 .00 .16 -.20 -.04
9. Scope Adaptation .18 .39 .12 .04 -.11 -.03 .03 -.05 -.02 .05
10. Market Dominance .21 .41 .05 -.25 .18 .37 -.25 -.19 -.24 .05 -.10
11. Merger Specific .56 .50 -.08 .11 -.05 -.20 .04 .01 -.03 .03 .02 -.32
Part 2:  Tends in Pricing Change From 1983 Base Year.
Price Change Cost Index Change Difference
Year Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Brand-Index
1985 .13 (.26) .05 (.17) .08
1986 .23 (.55) .15 (.41) .08
1987 .21 (.37) .14 (.29) .07
1988 .24 (.39) .16 (.27) .08
1989 .31 (.47) .21 (.31) .10
1990 .36 (.51) .24 (.31) .12
1 n=132; All correlations larger than .17 are significant at p#.05.Towards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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Part I of Table 2 presents the results from the six
individual regression models that were pooled using SUR.
All models are highly significant (p<.001) and all explain a
large percentage (from a low of .39 in 1990 to .high of .67 in
1987) of the variance in the Price Change measures. Part II
of Table 2 presents the results from a SUR analysis run in a
hierarchical manner on the overall system of the six
equations, or 792 observations (R
2 = .73). With this analysis,
we entered four blocks of variables into the model, beginning
with a block consisting of the two control variables, followed
by blocks consisting of the two ex ante structural variables,
the three ex post structural variables, and concluding with the
three conduct variables. Whereas the intent of the
regressions in Part I is to present six individual sets of tests
of the sub-hypotheses, the intent of the hierarchical
regression in Part II is to test the independent contribution
that each set of variables makes to explaining the dependent
variable.
9 Most importantly, the hierarchical regressions
provide a conservative test of our post-structural model. It
assesses the unique non-temporal rent contribution of
strategy by first partialling out all of the variances associated
with extraneous, initial, and dynamic market determinants.
From Part II of Table 2, we note that the block consisting
of the two control variables, taken as a system, explains a
large percentage (R
2 = .51) of the variance in Price Change,
although it appears from Part I that Cost Index Change is
consistently driving this result. That is, Cost Index Change
is highly significant (p<.001) in each of the six independent
annualized regression runs. This is a perfectly reasonable
finding: the ability of each branded product to raise its price
is largely explained by the cost (and thus price) pressures
that characterize its specific niche. Of course, had this
control variable been the only variable to explain the
variance in the dependent variable, our results would have
suggested that the post-merger price changes associated with
the merged branded products were driven primarily by
niche-wide changes in cost, and not by other structural and
strategic effects.
This is clearly not the case. First, the increases in prices
during the first two post-merger years (1985 and 1986)
occurs concurrently with an increase in market share (p< .05
and .001, respectively)—a real display of market power, for
product prices were being raised even as market share
increased. All subsequent price increases appear insensitive
to any Market Share Change. Finally, the ex ante block of
market structural variables, when taken as a system, explains
an additional 4 percent of the variance in Price Change over
that of the two variable control block (p<.01). This finding
                                               
9 We varied order of entry and thereby confirmed that the structural
and firm effects are indeed independent of one another.
is consistent with H1. The ability of a merging firm to earn
post-merger rents from its products (i.e., increase the output
price of its products net of the dynamic influences of changes
in cost and changes in market share, or demand elasticities)
is contingent upon the structure of each product's market at
the time immediately proceeding the merger. Interestingly,
the pre-merger Market Density (H1b) of the product niche in
1983 (the year immediately preceding the merger) seems to
be driving this result. That is, Initial Market Density explains
a significant portion of the residual variance in three of the
six annual Price Changes associated with a merged branded
product; i.e., in the third (p<.001), fourth (p<.05), and fifth
(p<.05) years following the merger, while Initial Market
Concentration (H1a) does not. However, the relationship
between Initial Market Density and the dependent variable is
in the opposite direction to what H1b predicted. That is, the
more dense the pre-merger niche (and therefore, by inference,
the lower the excess resource carrying capacity of that niche)
the more a branded product involved in a merger is able to
earn post-merger rents.
H2 predicted that the ability of a merging firm to earn
post-merger rents from its products is contingent upon the
changes that occurred in the structure of each product's niche
due in part to the merger. Consistent with H2, we find that
the block of merger-induced ex post or dynamic structural
changes, when taken as a system, make a significant
contribution towards explaining the residual variance in the
dependent variable. The hierarchical analysis shows that this
block of variables explains an additional 9 percent of the
variance in Price Change (p<.001) over what was explained
by the Control and ex ante block. Consistent with H2a,
Concentration Change shows itself to be significantly and
positively related to the dependent variable, although this
result is found only in the second (p<.01), third (p<.10) and
fourth (p<.10) years following the merger. Opposite to H2b,
the Density Change variable also shows itself to be
significantly and positively related to post-merger product
rents in first (p<.001) and second (p<.01) post-merger years,
such that Market Density increased, so did the rent from the
merged products. Curiously, though consistent with H2b, the
relationship becomes negative in the third post-merger year
(p<.01) and insignificant in the final three years. Finally, we
fail to find support for H2c and its prediction about market
growth in any of the six regression models. Given the modest
overall support for each of the corollary hypotheses of H2,
taken one at a time (Part I of Table 2), but the large
contribution made by the block of the three variables when
taken as a system in the hierarchical runs, may suggest that
the true contribution of the ex post structural variables comes
from how they act in consort with each other.
Finally, H3 predicts a merging firm can earn rents throughTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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Table 2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Using Data from Two 1984 Mergers: Nestlé/Carnation (=0) and RJR/Nabisco (=1)
1
Part 1: Individual Regressions
Price Change Price Change Price Change Price Change Price Change Price Change
One Year (1985) Two Years (1986) Three Years(1987) Four Years (1988) Five Years (1989) Six Years (1990)
Variable Beta Std err Beta Std err Beta Std err Beta Std err Beta Std err  Beta Std err
Intercept 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.15
Controls
  Market Share Change 0.11
* 0.48 0.12
*** 0.44 -0.04 0.27 0.06 0.24 -0.01 0.27 0.02 0.30








   Initial Market Structure 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.24
   Initial Market Density -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.38
*** 0.00 0.24
* 0.00 0.23
* 0.00 0.13 0.00
Dynamic Ex Post Structure
   Concentration Change 0.01 0.31 0.10
** 0.35 -0.06† 0.21 0.06† 0.18 0.00 0.16 -0.01 0.10
   Density Change 0.28
*** 0.00 0.17
** 0.01 -0.28
** 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00
   Market Growth -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Strategy
   Scope Adaptation 0.19





   Market Dominance 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.09 0.00 0.10
   Merger Specific -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.09† 0.04 -0.11 0.06 -0.17
* 0.07 -0.14† 0.08
Model







   R
2 0.50 0.66 0.67 0.41 0.40 0.39
Part 2: Hierarchical Regressions on Overall System of Six Seemingly  Unrelated Regression Equations.
Variable Set R-Square Change R-Sq. F-Stat Change
Control 0.51
Ex Ante 0.55 0.04 5.61**
Ex Post 0.64 0.09 9.89***
Strategy 0.73 0.09 14.19***
1 n=132; † p£..10; *p£.05; **p£.01; ***p£.001.Towards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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its own conduct over and above that provided by exogenous,
structural advantages. Clearly, H3 represents this study's
primary “reason for being”, for it is based on a post-
structural theoretical lens. Therefore, we are obviously
encouraged by the fact that we find strong support for H3.
First, the hierarchical regression runs show that the three
conduct variables, when taken as a system, explain an
additional 9% of the variance in the dependent variable
(p<.001); i.e., above the 63% that had already been
explained by the first three blocks of variables. Further, we
find consistent and enduring support for H3a: Specialist
Scope Adaptation is associated with significantly higher
post-merger rents than are Generalist Scope Adaptations in
five of the six regression runs, and approached significance
in the sixth (1986) run. Simply put, a merged firm appears
more able to increase the output price of its branded products
net of the dynamic influences of changes in cost and changes
in market share when it brings together two products that
hold similar resource spaces (e.g., such as potato and corn
chips) than two products that come from the same 4-digit
SIC code but hold unrelated resource spaces (e.g., canned
baby food and canned soup). Further, and just as
theoretically interesting, the advantage of this purposive
adaptation does not appear to be a short-lived anomaly; i.e.,
one destined to be eroded away by structural forces that
return all markets to their natural states of equilibrium. To
the contrary, while the relationship of all the hypothesized
structural variables with post-merger rents vanished by the
sixth year after the merger, the relationship between
Specialist Scope Adaptation and post-merger rents endured.
We also find support for H3c in three of the six regression
runs; i.e., 1987 (p<.10), 1989 (p<.05), and 1990 (p<.10).
The Nestlé/Carnation merger appears to have resulted in
higher post-merger rents for its involved branded products
than were the products involved with the RJR/Nabisco
merger. Of course, we had no priors to have predicted that
the Nestlé/Carnation merger would result in a post-merger
rent outcome. And, we noted that this merger-specific
conduct effect is hard to empirically specify with anything
other than a binary variable. However, we also noted the
intuitive difficulty in denying the influence of this
“unobservable” construct. Finally, we find no support for
H3b which predicts the advantages of Market Dominance.
5.1 Test of Sensitivity
We now turn our attention to 155 branded food products
involved in the 1988 Kraft/General Foods (K/GF) merger
and the two years of post-merger data available for those
products. As we observed for the two 1984 mergers in Table
1, the statistics in Part I of Table 3 also reveal a similarly
large negative correlation (-.55) between Initial
Concentration and Initial Density, and a similarly large
positive correlation (.95) between Initial Density and its ex
post counterpart, Density Change. Part I of Table 3,
however, reveals as interesting contrast with that reported in
Table 1. Many of the branded products involved in the K/GF
merger were among the top two selling brands in their
respective niche at the time of the merger, as revealed by the
mean value associated with the binary variable, Market
Dominance. Moreover, Market Growth, which was on
average negative (-3.36) in the product niches associated
with the two 1984 mergers, is positive overall (2.28) in the
155 product niches involved in the K/GF merger.
Part II of Table 3 also reveals an interesting contrast with
that reported in Table 1. K/GF increased its branded product
prices about 18 cents in 1989 and 13 cents in 1990, while the
Cost Index Change for each of those products increased on
average only 6 cents and 4 cents over the same two years. As
such, K/GF achieved a larger post-merger price differential
(on average 21 cents) between its merged products and the
private label products that sell in the same product niche,
than did the two 1984 mergers (8 cents after two years and
12 cents after 6 years). As we noted before, agricultural
economists interpret the differential between the price of a
branded product and that of its private label counterparts to
be a reasonable approximation of the branded product’s
profit margin.
Part I of Table 4 presents the two individual regression
results using SUR, and Part II presents the hierarchical runs
on the same four blocks of independent variables. Differing
from the regression model presented in Table 2, the Table 4
model omits the Merger-Specific categorical variable from
the block of Strategic Conduct variables, for the simple
reason that only one merger in this sample of merged
products is being examined. Nevertheless, the one year and
two year models are both highly significant (p<.001), though
they each explain only about half of the variance in the
dependent variable we observed for the models run on the
two 1984 mergers. As Part II of the Table suggests, much of
the decline in explanatory power appears attributed to the
block of the two control variables, which only explains 8%
of the variance in Price Change, in contrast to the 51% that
was observed with the two 1984 mergers. Further, the lower
correlation for the block seems largely attributed to the
reduced influence of Cost Index Change, which plays a much
smaller, though still statistically significant role in explaining
post-merger product rents.
Consistent with what we found with the two 1984 mergers,
each block of variables makes a significant contribution to
explaining the variance in the dependent variable, post-
merger rent. Also consistent with what we found, Initial
Market Density (H1b) is once again driving the results of theTowards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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Table 3  Descriptive Statistics for all Variables on the Kraft/General Foods Data.
Part 1: Correlations
1
Variable  mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Price Change .18 .25 —
2. Market Share Change -.01 .03 -.02
3. Cost Index Change .06 .18 .21 .03
4. Initial Market Conc. .43 .21 -.17 -.18 -.15
5. Initial Market Density 36.97 43.34 .38 .12 .12 -.55
6. Concentration Change .00 .13 -.16 .14 -.05 -.11 -.04
7. Density Change 6.14 10.15 .41 .05 .16 -.49 .95 -.06
8. Market Growth 2.28 86.64 .27 -.09 .21 -.43 .39 -.07 .44
9. Scope Adaptation .17 .37 -.06 -.19 .02 .29 -.23 -.04 -.19 -.13
10. Market Dominance .73 .45 -.08 -.09 -.26 .25 -.40 -.09 -.42 -.33 -.08
Part 2:  Trends in Pricing Change from 1987 Base Year
Price Change Cost Index Change Difference
Year Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Brand-Index
1989 .18 (.25) .06 (.18) .12
1990 .31 (.42) .10 (.32) .21
1 n=132; All correlations larger than .15 are significant at p#.05Towards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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Table 4 Seemingly Unrelated Regression of 1988 Kraft/General Foods
1
Part 1: Individual Regressions
Price Change Price Change
Years after the Merger One Year (1989) Two Years (1990)
Variable Beta Std err Beta Std err.
Intercept 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.11
Controls
  Market Share Change 0.04 0.55 0.04 0.61
  Cost Index Change 0.13* 0.09 0.18** 0.08
Ex Ante Structure
   Initial Market Concentration 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.18
   Initial Market Density 0.45** 0.00 0.63** 0.00
Dynamic Ex Post Structure
   Concentration Change -0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.24
   Density Change -0.03 0.00 -0.26* 0.01
   Market Growth 0.13* 0.00 0.17** 0.00
Strategy
   Market Dominance 0.15† 0.05 0.23** 0.07
   Scope Adaptation 0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.08
Model
   F 4.49** 6.47**
   R
2 0.22 0.29
Part 2: Hierarchical Regressions on Overall System of Six Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations.
Variable Set R-Square Change R-Sq. F-Stat Change
Control 0.08
Ex Ante 0.21 0.13 12.54***
Ex Post 0.31 0.09 6.54***
Strategy 0.38 0.07 8.44***
1 n=155; † p£.10; *p£.05; **p£ .01; ***p£.001Towards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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ex ante block of market factors, while Initial Market
Concentration (H1a) is not. Moreover, the relationship
between Initial Market Density and the dependent variable is
again positive, and thus opposite to what we had predicted.
In contrast to the 1984 finding, but consistent with H2c,
Market Growth shows a significant and positive relationship
with the dependent variable in both post-merger years,
whereas it had no bearing on the results in any of the six
annual post-merger regression runs. Finally, we again find
Strategic Conduct to matter, but unlike what we found with
the two 1984 mergers, the results for this block of variables
in being driven by Market Dominance and not Scope
Adaptation (H3a); i.e., consistent with H3c, K/GF attained
higher post-merger prices for their dominant brands than for
their low-share brands involved. Put differently, it appears
that Kraft and General Foods, by virtue of merging, were
able to leverage their dominant branded products so as to
reduce those products' cross-price elasticities with their direct
rivals, including the private labels.
6. Discussion
The separate theories of strategy, organizational ecology,
and industrial organization economics seem to be converging
to a “post-structural” view of competition, where markets are
dynamic and the inertial tendencies of organizations are
partly manageable. In this post-structural world, a firm has
some discretion to enact, adapt to, and manipulate its
environment. That is, a firm can, through its strategic
conduct, partially buffer itself from the full binding
constraints of its environmental forces, and in the process
earn rent. In testing this view of competition, we focused on
one very specific type of strategic adaptation: the
multifaceted product reorientation's occurring among
horizontally merging branded food products in mostly low
excess resource capacity selection niches. Recall that
horizontal mergers represent a deliberate and indisputable
change that can cause a firm and most of the involved
products to abruptly jump to new alignments with the
environment. Consistent with a post-structural view of
competition, we found strong evidence across the three
merger samples that firms can earn rents independent of
dynamic exogenous forces, and that these strategic conduct
related rents can persist for at least six years after the merger.
While others have debated whether the primary determinants
of performance are exogenous or endogenous, our results
thus suggest a more complex view which recognizes that not
all firms are equally capable of this kind of purposive
adaptation, nor are all environments equal in terms of their
binding constraints. We found that whether strategy matters
depends upon where (structure of niche), when (its timing, or
year that the strategy was implemented), by whom (the firm
and by inference its capabilities), and what (the dominance
and scope of the brand).
Our results contribute to the ecological literature, which
since the 1990s has become more intent on identifying which
environments favor successful adaptation (Haveman, 1992).
We found evidence that successful adaptation is possible,
even in relatively mature environments that are presumed to
possess low excess carrying capacity niches. We also found
mixed, albeit indirect support for the OE expectation that
multifaceted changes in scope initially engender coordination
problems (Iansiti, 1997), but those inertial problems
ultimately dissipate with trial, error, and time as the
organization learns to adjust (Ambergey, Kelly, and Barnett,
1993). For example, we found that it took at least three years
for performance differences to show up between the portfolio
of products involved in the Nestlé/Carnation merger and that
of the RJR/Nabisco merger. However, once the differences
appeared, they seemed to persist, always favoring the
Nestlé/Carnation products. Of course, the marginal level of
significance (p<.10) associated with this difference in two of
the three post-merger years that it was observed suggests this
pattern of differences might be due to chance. Alternatively,
the results might suggest temporal differences in abilities of
the two merged firms to successfully manage their inertial
tendencies.
In a similar vein, we found that the rent generating
potential of specialist scope adaptations that were strongly
apparent with the two 1984 mergers were not observed in the
Kraft/General Foods merger. Instead, K/GF quickly achieved
a larger post-merger price differential for its merged
products, essentially reducing those products' cross-price
elasticities with their direct rivals, including the private
labels. The K/GF merger took place at a different time
(1988), contained more than three times the percentage of
products that were dominant in their respective niches (.73
vs. .21), and involved niches with growth rates that were, on
average, marginally positive (2.3%) growth as opposed to
being negative (-3.4%). These and other differences may
have acted independently and in concert to produce a market
environment less favorable to successful specialist scope
adaptation, but more favorable for leveraging the value of
brands. Regarding the latter, recall that the late 1980s was a
time when food manufacturers were testing the limits of their
brands. For example, Kraft let the price of its cheese rise to
the point that it was 45% above that of its rivals in 1992
(The Economist, 12/4/93). Food Manufactures were also
showing a willingness to pay very high premiums to acquire
top selling brands. Witness not only the $12.9 billion
acquisition of Kraft in 1988, but also the $25 billion
leveraged buy-out of RJR/Nabisco.Towards a Post-Structural View of Competition Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill
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Of course, raising the price of dominant brands is
relatively easy and quick to administer, while leveraging the
advantages of specialist scope adaptation may require more
time and coordination efforts. As such, the sheer size of the
Kraft/General Foods merger in terms of the number of
different products and price may have overwhelmed the
merged firm’s adaptive ability, at least within the limited
two-year time in which we could examine this merger. As
anecdotal evidence, in the HBS Case, “Kraft-General Foods”
(Ruback, 1992:16) mentions that even by the end of 1990
the two companies had yet to be substantially merged
because of the daunting challenge of integrating Kraft with
the equally large General Foods, given their distinct cultures,
histories, and such politically charged questions as “What
management team would operate the new company?”
(Ruback, 1992:1).
It remains an open question whether we would have found
a product scope effect had SAMI continued to collect line-of-
product data into the 1990s, although we infer that we would
not. We base our speculation on: (1) the market value of
Philip Morris stock declined 5.5 percent in excess of market
movements on the day of the first announcement (October
18, 1988) of their intent to acquire Kraft, for a one-day loss
of $1.3 billion in shareholder value; (2) a recent study found
that the returns of merging to shareholders of acquiring firms
are sensitive to issues of cultural and administrative
compatibility (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Weber,
1992); and (3) Ruback’s (1992:3) comment that “judging by
the market response, shareholders would have preferred that
Philip Morris not acquire Kraft.”
It also remains an open question as to why Initial Market
Density was found to be positively related to the dependent
variable (as it was in the 1987, 1988, and 1989 models with
the two 1984 mergers, and in 1989 and 1990 with the K/GF
merger), when the theory for H1b predicted a negative
relationship. Contrasting the OE theory about Density with
the IO theory about spatial niches (Schmalensee, 1989; Levy
and Reitzes, 1992) might shed some light on the matter. OE
claims that the higher the density of the market, the less
excess resource carrying capacity of the market, and
therefore the less a single brand will be able to gain
extra-market advantages. Implicit to this claim is the
assumption of symmetric product differentiation; i.e., all
brands equally competed with all other brands in the same
product niche. IO theory about spatial niches questions the
ability of this assumption to explain competitive dynamics.
For example, in breakfast cereals, Shredded Wheat clearly
competes much more intensely with brands located near its
product-market space, such as Post Grape Nuts and
Kelloggs' Special K, than it does with General Foods’ Trix
(Cotterill and Haller, 1997). As such, the density of the
product niche may not precisely represent the level of excess
resource carrying capacity in each of the spacial,
micro-niches nested within the product niche. Put differently,
even data at the line of product unit of analysis may suffer
from a type of aggregation bias.
Finally, whereas structural analysis assumes market
position to be paramount, and thereby trivializes the role of
strategy, our ex post results suggest what the field of strategy
has intuitively known from its inception; i.e., “conduct” is at
least as deserving of theoretical and empirical attention as
“structure.” Our results also serve to remind the field of
strategic management of one of its founding assumptions;
i.e., strategy “can be viewed as the study of the singular,
uniquely competing firm in a changing environment”
(Hatten, 1979:454). This quote appeared in the book of
readings, edited by Schendel and Hofer, that had a profound
impact on the early thinking of the field. The simple meaning
of this quote is still very much at the forefront of the
pedagogy of strategy for those who teach by the case method.
However, the meaning tends to get overlooked by empiricists
who, for pragmatic reasons, favor cross-sectional research
designs which pool data at one point in time from dissimilar
firms and dissimilar industries, and/or use levels of analysis
that are subject to an aggregation bias. In summary, our
proposed post-structural model informs the field of strategy
by suggesting a clearer link between it and IO and OE, while
also paying homage to its founding heritage.
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